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Does corporate governance matter, evidence from earnings 
management practices in Singapore 
 
Abstract 
This paper addresses two questions. First, do good corporate governance practices add 
values to company or does it lead to higher stock returns in Singapore? Second, does 
poorly governed listed company in SGX tend to manage their earnings by using 
discretionary accruals? Following the approach of Gompers et al. (2003), we formed 
two portfolios consisting of well-governed and poorly governed companies. Well 
governed companies are able to maintain a higher return relative to poorly governed 
companies. I also look at the firm valuation from the adoption of corporate 
governance practices. Our result shows a positive relationship between firm valuation 
and corporate governance, we find Tobin’s Q to be significantly positively related to 
corporate governance. However, corporate governance does not necessarily improve 
firm’s performance. Finally, I also demonstrate that firm’s adoption of stringent 
corporate governance practices is associated with the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals, and limits discretion in earning management. Among different categories as 
prescribed by OECD, firms with best practices in the “Disclosure and transparency” 
category are associated with lower level of discretionary accruals. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
 
Promoted by corporate scandals like Enron and Bernard Madoff in the United States, 
Marconi in the United Kingdom, and China Aviation Oil in Singapore, corporate 
governance has received a lot of attention from the government and the investors. 
OECD stated that “The approach was not that these were problems associated with 
energy traders or telecommunications firms, but that they were systemic. These cases 
provide important lessons to government bodies as well as international regulators. 
Governments have taken actions to measure the corporate governance practices and 
tried to restore the public confidence in corporate governance.  
 
Literatures has documented that a positive relationship existed between firm values 
and corporate governance practices in United States, and some European countries. 
However, little has been done to look at the empirical evidences in Singapore. With 
the corporate governance index created and updated annually by Prof Jeremy Goh 
and his team in Singapore, we finally have a benchmark to measure the governance 
of Singapore listed firms and it provides solid data for serious research.   
 
This paper is consisted of 4 parts. In the first part, all the stocks traded on SGX 
Exchange are categorized according to their corporate governance scores. Following 
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the method developed by Gompers(2003), Two investment portfolios are built; the 
“well governed” portfolio is to buy the firms in the top quartile of index, while the 
“poor governed” portfolio is to long the firms in the bottom quartile of index. The 
sample period was set from 2006 to 2009. In this period we can found that the value 
of well governed portfolio is significantly above the poor governed portfolio in most 
of the months. The monthly returns are calculated and given that if we could 
synthesize an zero-investment portfolio by long the well governed portfolio and 
short the poor governed ones, we could made a average 2.4% yearly abnormal return 
in the sampling period.  
 
Following the first part, the second part looked into whether this abnormal positive 
return actually contributes a higher firm valuation eventually to well-governed 
companies. Among different firm valuation variables, Tobin’s Q showed that a 
higher level of corporate governance practices is associated with higher firm values. 
However, firm performance variables like net profit margin and return on equity are 
not able to produce similar results like firm valuation. 
 
On the third part, I want to look at the earning management activities reflected by 
companies with different levels of governance. Following Teoh et al (1998), I 
estimated the discretionary accruals from the modified Jones’ model. While the 
result in some extent is mixed, we could identify several corporate governance 
factors that influence the size of discretionary accruals. Among all those aspects, 
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“Disclosure and Transparency” in 2007 and 2008 has been proved associated with 
smaller size of discretionary accruals used by senior managers.  
 
The paper is organized as following. Chapter 2 reviews previous literatures on 
corporate governance, earnings management and portfolio analysis. Chapter 3 
presents the 4 hypotheses. Data description and sample selection are in chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 explains the methodology employed in this paper as well. Chapter 6 
provides results and analysis. Chapter 7 concludes. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Corporate Governance 
 
In public equity market, corporate need to raise funds from investors to operate and 
expand their business, investors have the funds but also require the managers’ talents 
and specialized skills to operate a modern firm and generate returns for their 
investments. Because of the separation of ownership and control, the managers and 
investors make a compromise that the shareholders are willing to sacrifice some of 
their rights in hopes of the managers will maximize their wealth, and the managers’ 
benefits will be subject to the board which represents the shareholders. Under this 
framework, corporate governance is considered as an agency problem resulted from 
in modern corporations. In reality, the person who run the firm have incentives to 
compensate themselves more than they deserved, or take high risk projects which 
will damage long term value of the firm. Although in certain situations this agency 
problem may not be the primary concerns, it is still a widely established fact. The 
object of good corporate governance is to solve this agency problem by maintaining 
the ideal balance of power, thus maximize the long term performance of the firm.  
 
In a broad way, business author Gabrielle O'Donovan defines corporate governance 
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as “an internal system encompassing policies, processes and people, which serve the 
needs of shareholders and other stakeholders, by directing and controlling 
management activities with good business savvy, objectivity, accountability and 
integrity. Sound corporate governance is reliant on external marketplace 
commitment and legislation, plus a healthy board culture which safeguards policies 
and processes”.1 He went on to explain that the quality of internal governance could 
influence the share price as well as the cost of capital. Quality is determined by how 
process and policies are built and implemented. Unlike the external market 
environment, the internal environment is constantly in control of senior managers 
and the board members. With good governance inside the company, it can differ 
themselves from other competitors.  
 
There is a wild range of literatures documented the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. Core, Holthausen, Larcker (1999) found that 
firms with weaker governance structures have bigger agency problems, thus CEOs in 
firms poorly governed will receive bigger compensation. They also found that firms 
with greater agency problems constantly perform worse than well governed firms.  
 
In another historical paper by Gompers, ishii, and Metrick (2003), it stated that firms 
with strong shareholder rights (termed Democracies) are found to have better 
operating performance than firms with weak shareholder rights (termed 
Dictatorships). Additionally, a hedged portfolio that long the Democracies and short 
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the Dictatorships gained an abnormal return of approximately 8.5% per year over the 
period from 1990 to 1999. In Europe, Bauer, Gunster, and Otten (2003) analyzed the 
relationship between different corporate governance standards and stock return, firm 
value, and operating performance for UK and countries in economic and monetary 
union (EMU) of the European Union. In UK they found economically large excess 
returns to a zero-investment portfolio replicated from Gompers’ paper. In the EMU, 
the excess return is smaller; instead they found a significant relationship between 
governance and firm value.  
 
The most obvious explanation is that managers are more likely to behave properly 
under a well governed firm. The shareholder may take into consideration this fact. 
Sonda (2001) found when a board is consisted of more experienced independent 
members, the board could more effectively reduce the manipulation of income by 
managers in firms than those boards with outside board members have less or no 
experience. Larger board, the importance of the ownership stakes in the firm held by 
non-executive directors are also proved to be associated with less income decreasing 
earnings management. The same evidences are also found in Taiwan stock market. 
 
Besides the above factors, one of the other theories explained the phenomenon in 
term of lower external financing cost brought by good corporate governance. Bhojraj 
and Sengupta (2003) found that well governed firms with extensive outside 
monitoring are rewarded with lower financing rate and higher bond ratings. On the 
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other hand, Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1995) found that it would be very 
difficult for firms in Italy without a proper governance system to obtain external 
financing or have to bear a higher rate. 
 
Relatively few studies on this issue have been investigated in Singapore market. I 
intend to try my best to contribute to this gap. Prof Goh has developed a corporate 
governance index for all listed companies on Singapore Exchange (SGX), which 
make it feasible to look at the actual effects of corporate governance on firm’s value, 
performance as well as earning management activities in Singapore. 
 
 
 
2.2 Portfolio Analysis, Firm Value and Operating Performance  
 
I would like to structure this piece of research by three parts. First, I will discuss 
previous literature on researching the association between long term equity return of 
a zero investment strategy based on corporate governance. This part will be followed 
by another piece focusing on the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
value. Finally I will look at the impact on firm operating performance. 
 
2.2.1 Portfolio analysis 
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Two important and closely related literatures in United States are Gompers et al. 
(2003) and Drobetz et al. (2003). Taking a long run horizon from 1990 to 1999, 
Gompers analyzed the impact of 24 corporate governance provisions on about 1,500 
stock returns. He constructed the corporate governance index as a proxy for the 
balance of power between shareholders and managers. Firms in the highest deciles of 
index are considered “Dictatorship Portfolio”, referring to the highest management 
power and firms in the bottom deciles are classified as “Democracy Portfolio” with 
weakest management power. They examine the returns to holding a long position in 
the dictatorship portfolio and a short position in democracy portfolio. This 
zero-investment hedged position yields an average annual return of about 8.5% in 
the sample period.  
 
In Germany Drobetz chose the time frame from 1998 to 2002, due to the limited data 
in governance. They assume constant ratings, and build their corporate governance 
index by sending out questionnaires and analyzed the answers. Though the 
methodology is different, Drobetz was able to generate reliable data and the result 
shows an amazing annual excess return of 16.4% with a long-short strategy. 
 
In EMU as a whole and UK, Bauer, Gunster and Otten built portfolios following 
Gompers’ methodology, the same strategy yields an annual return of 2.1% for the 
EMU and 7.1% for UK from Jan 1997 till July 2002, without any adjustments.  
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In this paper, I will investigate into the Singapore market following the above 
methods and study how the corporate governance affects the firms listed in 
Singapore. 
 
2.2.2 Firm value 
 
The empirical literature on the relationship between firm value and corporate 
governance usually compare firms with various internal governance practices, or 
countries with different governance standards. The firs type of research includes 
Drobetz et al.(2003) for Germany, Gompers et al.(2003) for the US, de Jong et 
al.(2001) for the Netherlands, Bauer et al.(2003) for UK and Black(2001) for Russia. 
These studies generally found a positive pattern between corporate governance and 
firm value 
 
La Portal et al. (2001) investigate into the second type, and proved that firms in 
developed countries, or countries with better governance standards tend to have a 
higher valuation. 
 
Combined the above two studies, I want to replicate their research in Singapore, 
based on the newly developed corporate governance index. 
 
 
                                                    9                                            
2.2.3 Firm operating performance  
 
Compared to the other two subjects, there are rather few empirical literatures which 
covered this area. Most studies are focusing on one or few certain governance 
characteristics, like the board’s average age. The proxies for firm operating 
performance are generally profitability ratios.  
 
Here, again, I would follow Gompers et al.(2003), their data results show a positive 
impact of corporate governance on Net Profit Margin and Return on Equity in the 
United States.   
 
 
2.3 Earning Management and Discretionary Accrual  
 
Earning management is referring to accounting manipulations that may follow 
accounting polices, but clearly deviate from providing accurate, relevant and reliable 
information to outside shareholders. 
 
2.3.1 Motivations for earning management  
 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), "earnings management" occurs when 
managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter 
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financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of a company or influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers.” Listed firms in Singapore follow certain accounting 
rules, which are not a set of solid rules but give managers some freedom to adjust 
their figures to reveal their true financial situation. However, some managers make 
use of this privilege and adjust the figures to a favorable level to obtain unjustified 
benefits for the company or themselves. In practice, earning management usually 
involves manipulating revenue, profit, receivables upwards to a favorable level. 
Aggressive earnings management is a form of fraud and differ from reporting error. 
 
Literatures investigating into earning management are usually event studies 
conditional on certain events like bond offering and initial public offerings. Earning 
management can be either increasing or decreasing the earning, all subject to the 
manager’s discretion.  
 
Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b) found significantly positive earnings manipulation 
for firms before seasoned public offerings as an attempt to achieve better pricing in 
the stock market. And they also found such firms usually went through a period of 
poor stock performance which lasts for three years. Shivakumar (2000) found a 
similar result, and he goes further to look at whether the investors and outsiders are 
being tricked by artificially high earnings, his results showed a negative relation 
between pre-announcement abnormal accruals and the stock price reaction to the 
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offering announcements. In other words, the investors are aware of the manager’s 
earning management practices and respond to their actions correspondingly. Caton, 
Chiyachantana, Chua and Goh (2008) found significant earnings management efforts 
by issuers to window dress their firms’ performance in the year of the seasoned bond 
offering, while their behavior are not found to have material impacts on their ratings 
given by rating agencies. 
 
Unlike the seasoned bond offering, the research on initial public offering generated 
mixed results. As a pioneer in this area, Teoh Welch and Wong (1998) recorded 
aggressive earnings management for firms that are undertaking IPOs. Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008) attacked Teoh’s research on US data by suggesting six possible 
weaknesses in the argument. They argue that the discretionary accruals estimated in 
Teoh et al.’s paper is too large to be credible, the accruals estimated from working 
capital and IPO proceedings are biased. Therefore Ball et al. concluded from UK 
market data that publicly listed companies on average provide higher quality 
financial reporting than private companies, IPO firms in UK have no systematic 
earning inflation and sometimes even conservative. They also believed that a set of 
mechanisms is in place to enforce IPO firms to produce high quality financial 
reporting, such as reputation effects, cost of capital effects, and monitoring by 
internal and external auditors, boards, analysts, rating agencies, the press, litigators 
and the other parties. 
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Some literatures documented the earning management efforts trying to decrease the 
earnings. Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008) found a significant negative earning 
manipulation before a possible merger or a post-merger lawsuit, this may reveals that 
the managers want to lower the share price to facilitate their open market purchase. 
 
Earning management can serve the purposes of maximizing bonus or regulatory 
concerns. Healy (1985) analyzed different typical compensation contracts; they 
found a strong connection between accruals and the bonus scheme applied to the 
managers. Managers are more likely to choose income-decreasing accruals when 
their bonus plan upper or lower bounds are binding, and income-increasing accruals 
when these bounds are not binding. Guidry, Leone and Rock (1999) further support 
this finding by suggesting divisional heads in U.S. conglomerate managed the 
figures to maximize their bonus. Earning management also occurs before certain 
regulation reforms. Before the tax reform 1986, Gunther shows that big firms, firms 
with low level of debt or firms with higher management stakes produce significantly 
more negative accruals to take advantage of this large decrease of corporate tax. 
Similarly, Jones (1991) found that discretionary accruals are more 
income-decreasing than expected accruals during import relief investigations (e.g. 
tariff increases and quota reductions). 
 
Besides earning management could bring various benefits to managers, it is also 
difficult to be detected by board and outside shareholders. In Watts and Zimmerman 
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(1978), it suggested that managers not only have incentive to manipulate earnings, 
but also alter its income-production decisions as the cost for government 
intervention becomes larger.  
 
 
2.3.2 Detect the earning management  
 
One of the earliest method using in detect earning management is simply draw the 
distribution of earnings before certain events. Burgstahler, Dichev looked into the 
cross-sectional distribution of earning changes, and found unusually low frequency 
of small decrease in earning changes and unusually high frequency of small increase 
in earning changes. This effect is more significant when the firms have gone through 
more years of earning increase. Two components, cash flow from operation and 
working capital are used to manipulate the earnings. This method is straightforward, 
but subject to a lack of quantitative analysis, and also it requires a large sample in 
order to reach a meaningful conclusion, thus not suitable for a medium size market 
like Singapore. 
 
The most common method to quantitatively analyze the earning management is 
developed by Jones (1991). His method is to decompose total accruals to 
discretionary accrual and non-discretionary accrual. Most accounting decisions 
involve some accruals. For example, selling on credit leads to the creation of 
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accruals because the sale is recognized along with a receivable, even when there is 
no actual cash received as yet. Most accruals are a normal part of a firm’s business 
and tend to reverse out over time. A receivable will be reversed when cash is 
received. The usage of accruals is in compliance with accounting principles in 
purpose of matching cash flow and trying to get a better economic measure of period 
performance than cash flows. It also provides a potential manipulating opportunity 
for managers to revise the accounting figures for their own interests. Jones (1991) 
suggested that non-discretionary is associated with changes in revenue and 
investment in property, plant and equipment, and not subject to managers’ discretion. 
The critical part, discretionary accrual is subject to managers’ decisions whether to 
include this part in the final accounting figures. Firms with high positive 
discretionary accruals are likely to be managing earnings upwards, while firms with 
low positive discretionary accruals are likely to be managing earnings downwards. 
 
DeAngelo (1986), Healy (1985), and McNichols and Wilson (1988) first applied this 
idea and use discretional accruals as a proxy for earnings management activities, 
where they consider non-discretionary accruals a constant. Jones (1991) modified 
their models and relaxed the assumptions that non discretionary accruals are constant 
over time. Non-discretionary accruals in her model is estimated from a cross 
sectional regression to capture the influence from revenue changes. Dechow and 
Sloan (1991) further modified Jones model by adding in industry specific variables, 
their regression is conducted during each industry to remove the influences from 
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industry-specific variables. Teoh et al. (1998) went further to use discretionary 
current accruals, rather than total discretionary in his IPO event study. 
 
Total accruals can be calculated from balance sheet items or simply the differences 
between earnings and cash flows. Hribar, Collins (2002) found potentially large 
measurement error in the balance sheet methods. Especially if there are corporate 
actions like merger & acquisition or discontinued operation, the discretionary 
accruals are easily inflated and leads to flawed conclusion than earning management 
exists when there is actually none. Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) proved that if 
researchers could match the accruals to performance, the discretionary accruals 
generated would be much more reliable to estimate the level of earning management 
in firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    16                                            
Chapter 3  
 
Hypothesis Development 
 
As literatures in the US and UK proved the link between corporate governance and 
stock returns, and managers have incentives to manipulate earnings. Here I would 
like to look at firms listed on Singapore equity market. Following Gompers’ research, 
Hypothesis 1 is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis I: corporate governance does not cause significant impacts on firms, and 
bring no abnormal return in Singapore equity market. 
 
Following bauer, Gunster and Otten’s paper, In UK and EMU corporate governance 
can enhance firm value as well as firm operating performance. When I am looking at 
Singapore market, my hypothesis is organized as follows: 
 
Hypothesis II: corporate governance does not cause significant positive impact on 
firm values measured by Tobin’s Q Singapore equity market 
 
Hypothesis III: corporate governance does not cause significant positive impact on 
firm operating performance represented by net profit margin or return on equity in 
Singapore equity market. 
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If we could prove that good corporate governance indeed bring benefits to firms like 
higher stock return. Next step is to explore why, corporate governance is often 
considered an indicator for managers’ disciplines. The investor may be willing to pay 
a higher price for firms which have better corporate governance system in place, 
because they can trust the financial information given by managers. 
 
Hypothesis IV: In Singapore equity market earning management activities will not 
be significantly lower when there are better corporate governance practices in place. 
 
In the next chapter I would like to introduce the data and sample selection for my 
research in clarifying the above hypothesis 
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Chapter 4  
 
Data and Methodology 
 
4.1 corporate governance index compositions 
 
To measure the companies’ quality of governance we use corporate governance 
index released by Dept. Finance, SMU. They are based on about 200 independent 
criteria, which are further categorized into the following Sub-index. 
 
1. Sub-index A: Rights of Shareholders: this sub-index evaluate whether 
shareholders could exert sufficient power to interfere corporate actions whenever 
necessary. As the OECD principles on corporate governance stated “Organizations 
should respect the rights of shareholders and help shareholders to exercise those 
rights. They can help shareholders exercise their rights by effectively communicating 
information that is understandable and accessible and encouraging shareholders to 
participate in general meetings.” For instance the voting system is assessed to make 
sure it is in favorable for the shareholders, and shareholders should be able to file 
items on the agenda and counterproposal before and during the general meetings.  
 
2. Sub-index B: Equitable treatment of Shareholders: this sub-index evaluate 
whether all the shareholders have been treated equally and prohibit behaviors that 
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would benefit certain groups of shareholders while sacrificing the others like insider 
trading, abusive self dealing, etc. this sub-index includes criteria like proxy voting, 
shareholders’ participation of general meeting. 
 
3. Sub-index C: Roles of Stakeholders in CG: the stakeholder model suggests that 
the purpose of the operation is to serve a wider range of stakeholders’ interests than 
just shareholder, which would in turn ensure the long term health and benefits of the 
firm. This sub-index includes criteria like the interaction with suppliers, vendors and 
customers.  
 
4. Sub-index D: Disclosure and Transparency: this category measures the degree to 
which the firm is willing to share convenient and comprehensive information with 
outside shareholders. The information includes financial matters and its governance 
characteristics. For instance, the company should releases information about its full 
financial statements, company structure and plans for future investment. One 
specific aspect we put in more emphasize is the senior managers’ compensation in 
different forms must be clearly stated.  
 
5. Sub-index E: Responsibilities of the Board: this category describes the purpose, 
authority and responsibilities of the board. Important criteria in this category 
includes the composition of board, the board members’ profiles and qualifications, 
roles within different committees, and board meeting agenda. 
                                                    20                                            
 In this paper we have over 120 criteria in total to assess one firm’s corporate 
governance practices, covering all the sectors listed in SGX. Since the index has 
been complied from 2007, we are able to possess the equity market data of 2007 and 
2008, which are two extremely volatile years in Singapore equity market. To explore 
whether sectors differ in their governance standards, we present sector average in 
Table 1. Clear significant sector difference in governance score is observed, so the 
following analysis always includes a sector adjusted result as robustness check 
 
 Insert Table 1 Here 
 
 
4.2 Portfolio analysis by applying Fama French three factor model and Carhart 
momentum factor 
 
To analyze the impact of corporate governance on equity return, all SGX listed firms 
are ranked on the basis of the corporate governance index; we assign the top 25% of 
the companies with highest corporate governance practices rating to “well governed 
portfolio”, and the bottom 25% is labeled as “poor governed portfolio”. Both of the 
portfolios are value weighted. We could easily synthesize a zero investment portfolio 
by longing the well governed group and shorting the poor governed group. 
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To understand the return characteristics of this zero investment portfolio, we would 
like to explore whether this premium can be explained by market risk and other 
common factors.  
 
Here I would like to borrow the idea from Fama-French (1992, 1993) three factors 
model and the momentum factors developed by Jegadeesh and Titman(1993). Stock 
returns from the above portfolio are likely to be influenced by market risk beta, 
firm’s market value or capitalization (size effect), book to market ratio (value effect), 
and the past returns (momentum effect). To account for these factors, I will employ 
the Carhart (1997) four factor model, which is  
 
ttttfmtLST MOMHMLSMBRRR εββββα ++++−+= 421 3)(       
(1) 
 
Where  is the excess monthly return of the zero-investment portfolio,  is 
the monthly return on the market portfolio and is the monthly risk free interest 
rate obtained from Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). (Small minus 
Big) is the monthly return on a size factor portfolio, (High minus Low) is the 
monthly return on a book-to-price factor mimicking portfolio based on the 
book-to-market ratio. (Momentum) is the monthly return on a momentum 
factor portfolio.  
LSTR mtR
fR
tSMB
tHML
tMOM
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tSMB  and  portfolios are constructed following the method of Fama and 
French (1993). Both portfolios are formed on the firm’s market capitalization at the 
end of June every year, and acted as control variables from July to next year June. 
For , the companies with the lowest 30% of market value are defined as 
“Small”, while the highest 30% are labeled as “Big”. The return used in the 
regression is the return from “Small” portfolio minus “Big” Portfolio. For , the 
factor mimicking portfolio is constructed similarly, the top 30% with the highest 
book to market ratio is the “Value” portfolio, and the bottom 30% is the “Growth” 
portfolio, the return used in regression is to subtract the return on “Growth” from the 
return on “value”. 
tHML
tSMB
tHML
 
tMOM  is defined according to Carhart (1997). To build  portfolio, each 
month we calculated the 30% of firms with the highest eleven-month returns lagged 
one-month as “Winner” portfolio, the 30% firms with the lowest eleven-month 
returns lagged one-month are included in “Loser” portfolio. Each month the return is 
calculated as “Winner” minus “Loser”.  
tMOM
 
All the portfolios are value-weighted, exclusive of the overstated effects from stocks 
of small capitalization firms. 
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4.3 Corporate governance, Firm value and Firm performance 
 
We use Tobin’s Q as out measure of firm valuation. Tobin’s Q is defined as the 
market value of asset divided by the replacement value of assets. The replacement 
value is represented by book value; the market value calculated as book values plus 
common shares outstanding times stock price and subtract balance sheet deferred 
taxes. 
 
To evaluate the impact of corporate governance and other factors on firm valuation, I 
would use multivariate regression analysis. In line with Gompers et al. (2003) as 
well as Shin and Stulz (2000), the book value and firm age are included as control 
variables. According to Daines (2001) and Yermack (1996) showed that current and 
past performance significantly affect firm value, we also include current return on 
equity (ROE) and ROE in previous year to control the effect from firm performance. 
The equation is as below: 
 
ititititititit ROEROEAGEBVCGQ εβββββα ++++++= −154321          
(2) 
 
Where CG represents the logarithm of corporate governance score released by SMU, 
BV is the logarithm of the book value of assets and AGE is the logarithm of firm’s 
age in years, started from the first IPO date or the first trading day. ROE represents 
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the firm’s return on equity in current and previous year.  
 
The sector adjusted version of equation (2) is also shown as below: 
 
itititititititit SDROEROEAGEBVCGQ εββββββα +++++++= − 6154321 (3
) 
 
Where  represents a vector of sector dummy variables, according to the sector 
categories described in table 1. 
itSD
 
In terms of evaluating the impact of corporate governance on firm performance, here 
I would like to propose two proxies of firm operation efficiencies to measure the 
impact of corporate governance. The first proxy is Net Profit Margin (NPM) in 
model 1, the equation is as below: 
 
itititit BMCGNPM εββα +++= 21                                      
(4) 
 
The second proxy in model 2 is Return on Equity  
 
εββα +++= ititit BMCGROE 21                                       (5) 
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Where CG is the logarithm of firm’s corporate governance rating, BM is the 
logarithm of the book-to-market ratio. 
 
The sector-adjusted versions of equation (4) & (5) are shown below: 
ititititit SDBMCGNPM εβββα ++++= 321                              (6) 
εβββα ++++= itititit SDBMCGROE 321                               (7) 
 
4.4 Discretionary Accruals  
 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) tested several models of accrual management 
and found out the “modified Jones model” detect the earning managements with the 
most power. Cross section version of the modified Jones model was also found 
useful in Bartov, Gul and Tsui’s paper in 2001. Although its power has been 
questioned by Ball & Shivakumar in their several papers, it remains one of the most 
popular models for estimating accrual behavior. Besides normal modified Jones 
model, here I would like to apply an additional modified model proposed by Cornett, 
marcus, Saunders and Tehranian in 2006, and an “augmented Jones model” raised by 
Cohen, Dey and Lys in 2004 to improve the robustness of the result. 
 
Discretionary or abnormal accrual is the difference between actual accrual and 
predictive accruals, which is estimated by a regression formula. 
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The modified Jones model estimates normal accruals from the equation: 
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TA ββα                       
(8) 
Where  is the total accrual for firm i in the year t,  is the total assets 
for firm i in the year t,  is the change in sales for firm i in year t and 
 is the property, plant, equipment for firm i in year t. The regression is 
estimated within each sector category to adjust for sectors. 
itTA 1−itAssets
itSalesΔ
1−itPPE
 
Total accruals can be estimated as: 
onDepreciatiLiabilitesCurrentinDebtTermLong
sLiabilitieCurrentAssetsCashNonCurrentTAi
−Δ+
Δ−Δ=
_____
____
              
(9) 
Or  
OperationFromCashIncomeNetTAi ___ −=                            
(10) 
 
Equation (10) is used for robustness check, so here I would like to show the 
calculation of discretionary accruals by using equation (9). 
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(11) 
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 Where the coefficients in the bracket is estimated from equation (8) 
 
Large value of discretionary accrual is usually considered as indicative of earning 
management activities. Because discretionary accruals can be used to both increase 
or decrease accruals, in some contexts (e.g., Klein, 2002 or Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 
2004) the absolute value of discretionary accruals is considered the best measure to 
determine whether earning management occurs and the size of earnings management. 
Also Bergstresser and Philippon in 2004 study absolute accruals, they show that the 
late 1990s was characterized by a strong secular increase in accruals. I also found 
that in 2007 the discretionary accruals are mostly positive and in 2008 they are 
mostly negative. The size of absolute value of discretionary accruals may provide a 
more straightforward view on the earning management activities in the market. 
 
4.5 Other data 
 
The sample here consisted of all firms listed on Singapore Exchange (SGX) from 
July, 2001 to Oct, 2009. In calculating discretionary accruals, the sample size is all 
firms listed from July 2006 to Oct 2009. Balance sheet data are from Compustat 
Global. Corporate governance index and sub-index figures are from Prof Jeremy 
Goh of Singapore Management University. This corporate governance index is 
relatively stable, and the fact that the firms are neither in IPO stage or financial 
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distress make Ball and Shivakumar’s concern less of an issue here. 
 
The firm valuation is represented by Tobin’s Q, defined as the market value of the 
firm divided by the replacement value of assets. The firm operating performance is 
represented by net profit margin and return on equity. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Result: 
 
5.1 Corporate Governance and portfolio Returns 
 
Relied on the corporate governance index synthesized and released by Singapore 
Management University, I built two portfolios based on the top 25% and the bottom 
25% well governed companies. The portfolios are value weighted, as well as all the 
control variables.  
 
Using monthly valuation, a clear pattern has emerged that the well governed 
portfolio are always valued at a higher price than poor governed companies. The 
average premium for the portfolio consisted of top 25% well governed companies is 
5% compared to the portfolio of bottom 25%. 
 
From graph 1 we could also tell that the well governed portfolio is valued 
significantly higher than the poor governed portfolio in average from July, 2006 to 
Oct, 2009.  
 
Inset Figure 1 Here  
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 Without any adjustments of market risk, this zero-investment could produce a 
monthly abnormal positive return of 0.2% from July, 2006 to Oct, 2009, equivalent 
to a 2.4% annually.  
 
Inset Table 2 Here 
 
To further analyze this abnormal return, Fama French three factor models as well as 
the momentum factor are applied. The results of estimating equation (1) are shown 
in table 1. The first row presents the regression estimates to market return and alpha, 
the significance lies in the coefficient of market return, which reveals the 
zero-investment portfolio still contains some market risk exposures. The second row 
and the third row include the other two factors from Fama-French model. The final 
row contains another variable to describe the momentum existed in the market. 
 
We can see from the table, a large part of this zero-investment corporate governance 
directed portfolio performance is attributed to size and value effect, the momentum 
effect is not found to significantly affect the portfolio performance.  
 
 
Inset Table 3 Here 
 
 
 
                                                    31                                            
 5.2 Corporate Governance and Firm Value 
 
If better governed companies can lead to higher stock return, in the long run, it 
should eventually leads to higher firm valuation. So here we are investigating to 
which extent the corporate governance practices has affected the firm valuation in 
the equity market. 
 
Table 2 shows the cross section regression result from year 2008. Alpha represents 
the residual value after controlling for common valuation variables. Then we have 
very interesting result, we can always harvest a positive significant alpha unless we 
throw in the corporate governance factor. The positive coefficient of corporate 
governance also shows that a firm’s valuation revealed by Tobin’s Q is significantly 
related to the firm’s corporate governance practices.  
  
Inset Table 5 Here  
 
 
Table 3 shows the cross section regression result from year 2007. I am able to find 
significant patterns which are in line with the year 2008 result. From the market we 
know that these two year are extremely volatile year and the firm’s valuation may 
change dramatically. The same pattern found in different years reveals a consistent 
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positive impact of corporate governance on firm’s valuation in Singapore market. In 
other words, after controlling for various variables, the well governed companies are 
valued at a significantly high level compared to the poor governed firms, in both 
2007 and 2008. 
 
 
Inset Table 4 Here 
 
 
All the regression are sector adjusted by using sector dummies to avoid 
contaminated by sector characteristics described in table 1. 
 
 
5.3 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
 
As shown by Jensen and Meckling (1976), better governed firms might have more 
efficient operations, resulting in a higher expected future cash flow stream and 
possibly higher firm performance. We estimate the regressions for 2007 and 2008 
respectively; t statistics are presented in the following table. 
 
 
Inset Table 6 Here 
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 As table 6 shows, from both models in both years, I was unable to find a consistent 
significant relationship between corporate governance and firm efficiency. The 
inclusion of corporate governance scores does not provide solid support for firm 
performance. This result is in contrary to my expectation. 
 
 
 
5.4 Corporate Governance and Discretionary Accrual 
 
Table 7 show the descriptive statistics for discretionary accruals calculated in both 
the year 2007 and 2008. From the statistics we can clearly see that the discretionary 
accruals in year 2007 are mostly positive while the discretionary accruals in 2008 are 
mostly negative. It is reasonable because in good year firms tend to sell more on 
credit which leads to higher total accruals, and managers have incentive to manage 
income upwards to match the general market performance. In bad year the investors 
can be tolerable with lower level of income so it should be a good time to cut down 
income and realize the income in the future to make beautiful growth figures. 
 
 Inset Table 7 Here 
 
Table 8 presents results on the regression of discretionary accruals to control 
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variables and different aspects of corporate governance from sub-index A to 
sub-index D in year 2007. Discretionary accruals in the table are estimated from 
modified Jones model. In regression 1, the dependent variable is the discretionary 
accrual as a percent of sales. In regression 2 the independent variables are the same 
except that the dependent variable is the size of the discretionary accruals as a 
percent of asset. Though most of the coefficient is not significant, still the coefficient 
is negative and their existence could decrease the size of discretionary accruals. 
 
Inset Table 8 Here  
 
Table 9 presents results on the regression of discretionary accruals to control 
variables and different aspects of corporate governance from sub-index A to 
sub-index D in year 2008. The regression setup is following the table 8. we found 
significant relationship between “Disclosure and Transparency” and the size of 
discretionary, however there is also unexpected result that sub-index B has a positive 
relationship with the size of discretionary accruals, which will be diminished in the 
following panel data regression shown in table 10 
 
 
Inset Table 9 Here 
 
 
In the full sample dataset regression, although we found that most of the 
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discretionary accruals (DCA) are positive in 2007, and negative in 2008. In the full 
sample the most coefficients of sub-index are negative which will help decreasing 
the size of discretionary accruals. From the model 2, we can tell that especially “The 
Right of Stakeholders” and “Disclosure and Transparency” are among the most 
significant variables.  
 
The most significant factor is “The Right of Shareholders”; Disclosure and 
transparency has the largest negative coefficient, in the firm having more disclosure 
and transparent information we can observe smaller size of DCA. Therefore both 
factors play important roles in reducing the size of DCA and deserved future 
attentions. 
 
However, there is one exception which is the equitable treatment of shareholder, it 
significantly increases the size of DCA in year 2008, and this effect disappears in full 
sample test. I would like to discuss in the following discussion section. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Discussion 
 
In this study we examined the corporate governance practices in Singapore market. 
The relationship between good corporate governance and firm value, firm 
performance and share price was investigated based on the corporate governance 
index developed by Prof Jeremy Goh and his team. Though the year span is only 
limited to 2007 and 2008, it still gives us a chance to conduct cross-sectional study 
on Singapore listed firms. 
 
Here we documented the significant and positive return generated by buying stock 
with a top 25% corporate governance score and selling stock in the bottom 25%. The 
results from UK, Europe and The States are also shown the similar results. While we 
use tobin’s q as a proxy for firm value, better corporate governance are associated 
with higher firm value, probably because the stock price premium reflected.  
 
The other interesting phenomenon is the relationship between the corporate 
governance and the size of discretionary accruals. The higher the overall corporate 
governance score, the smaller size of discretionary accruals in the same year was 
detected. To break further, “The Right of Shareholders” contributes the most to this 
effect. The reason can be explained in the way that the managers under more 
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stringent governance framework tend to be more careful when using discretionary 
accrual to present firm performance, thus reflecting a more real financial picture of 
the firm. Other factors like value effect and size effect also play important parts in 
this effect.  
 
Overall, the impacts of corporate governance in Singapore market is in line with the 
other markets like UK and Europe, revealing the essence of corporate governance in 
the economical activities. 
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Appendix I  
 
Top 10% well governed companies listed on SGX (Year 2008) 
Tiong Woon Corp Holding Ltd Okp Holdings Ltd 
Richland Group Ltd Sembcorp Industries Ltd 
Tai Sin Electric Cables Manufacturer Ltd StarHub Ltd 
Pteris Global Ltd United Engineers Ltd 
CNA Group Ltd Idt Holdings (Singapore) Ltd 
HLN Technologies Ltd InnoTek Ltd 
Yellow Pages (Singapore) Ltd Hyflux Ltd 
Europtronic Group Ltd Olam International Ltd 
CWT Ltd Best World International Ltd 
Mobileone Ltd Singapore Press Holdings Ltd 
PSC Corp Ltd Tuan Sing Holdings Ltd 
Keppel Telecommunications & Transportation 
Ltd First Resources Ltd 
Sembcorp Marine Ltd Fj Benjamin Holdings Ltd 
Asia Pacific Breweries Ltd Singapore Technologies Engineering Ltd 
Straits Asia Resources Singapore Airlines Ltd 
Banyan Tree Holdings Ltd Sia Engineering Co Ltd 
Qian Hu Corp Ltd Keppel Corp Ltd 
Singapore Petroleum Co Ltd Indofood Agri Resources Ltd 
Neptune Orient Lines Ltd Comfortdelgro Corporation Ltd 
SMRT Corp Ltd Singapore Post Ltd 
Singapore Telecommunications Ltd Cerebos Pacific Ltd 
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Top 10% poorly governed companies listed on SGX (Year 2008) 
 
Advance Modules Group Ltd China Video Surveillance Ltd 
Ban Leong Technologies Ltd General Magnetics Ltd 
Advance SCT Ltd Nti International Ltd 
Lorenzo International Ltd Broadway Industrial Group Ltd 
Singapore Food Industries Ltd Khong Guan Flour Milling Ltd 
Magnus Energy Group Aspial Corporation Ltd 
Cse Global Ltd Guthrie Gts Ltd 
Creative Technology Ltd Texchem Pack Holdings Singapore Ltd 
STATS ChipPAC Ltd Casa Holdings Ltd 
Jacks International Ltd Compact Metal Industries Ltd 
Contel Corp Ltd Chemical Industries (Far East) Ltd 
Huan Hsin Holdings Ltd Hotel Grand Central Ltd 
Mediaring Ltd Digiland International Ltd 
Singatronics Ltd A-Sonic Aerospace Ltd 
Time Watch Investments Ltd Vibropower Corp Ltd 
Internet Technology Group Ltd Enviro-Hub Holding 
Cacola Furniture International Limited Htl International Holdings Ltd 
Enporis Greenz Limited Zagro Asia Ltd 
Ban Joo & Co Ltd Zhonghui Holdings Ltd 
Rickers Maritime Chuan Soon Huat Industrial Group Ltd 
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Top 10% well governed companies listed on SGX (Year 2007) 
 
Hour Glass Ltd Darco Water Technologies Ltd 
Delong Holdings Ltd Singapore Airport Terminal Services Ltd 
Tuan Sing Holdings Ltd Keppel Corp Ltd 
HL Global Enterprises Limited Fu Yu Manufacturing Ltd 
Petra Foods Ltd Sembcorp Marine Ltd 
Singapore Food Industries Ltd Cerebos Pacific Ltd 
Advance SCT Ltd Cougar Logistics Corp 
United Engineers Ltd Advanced Holdings Ltd 
Multi-Chem Ltd A-Sonic Aerospace Ltd 
Azeus Systems Holdings Ltd Penguin International Limited 
Adroit Innovations Ltd Sembcorp Industries Ltd 
Sia Engineering Co Ltd Bbr Holdings (S) Ltd 
Wbl Corp Ltd Neptune Orient Lines Ltd 
Singapore Technologies Engineering Ltd Singapore Telecommunications Ltd 
Singapore Post Ltd Europtronic Group Ltd 
Ossia International Ltd SP Chemicals Ltd 
Cosco Corporation (Singapore) Ltd Ferrochina Ltd 
Portek International Ltd SMRT Corp Ltd 
Tat Seng Packaging Group Ltd Singapore Petroleum Co Ltd 
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Top 10% poorly governed companies listed on SGX (Year 2007) 
 
Vibropower Corp Ltd Dragon Group Intl Ltd 
Viz Branz Ltd Eastgate Technology Ltd 
Yangzijiang Shipbuilding Holdings Ltd Liang Huat Aluminium Ltd 
STATS ChipPAC Ltd Challenger Technologies Ltd 
China Printing & Dyeing Holding Ltd Shanghai Turbo Enterprises Ltd 
Creative Technology Ltd China Hongcheng Holdings Ltd 
Eastern Holdings Ltd Chemical Industries (Far East) Ltd 
Pan-United Corp Ltd Casa Holdings Ltd 
Ban Leong Technologies Ltd China Auto Corp Ltd 
Abterra Ltd L. C. Development Ltd 
Ban Joo & Co Ltd Jets Technics International Holdings Ltd 
Mediaring Ltd Teckwah Industrial Corp Ltd 
Zagro Asia Ltd King Wan Corp Ltd 
Eucon Holding Ltd Lum Chang Holdings Ltd 
Contel Corp Ltd Sin Ghee Huat Corp 
Ap Oil International Ltd Sunmart Holdings Ltd 
Straco Corp Achieva Ltd 
Yhi International Ltd Kingsmen Creatives Ltd 
 Elec & Eltek International Co Ltd 
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Appendix II Corporate Governance Questionnaire 
 
 
Appendix II Corporate Governance Questionnaire   
Question  Survey Question  
Number   
 
Section A -- Rights of Shareholders  
A.1  Does the company offer other ownership rights beyond voting?  
Is the decision on the remuneration of board members or executives 
approved by the shareholders annually? A.2*  
  
A.3*  How is the remuneration of the board presented?  
A.4*  Quality of Notice to call Shareholders Meeting in the past one year.  
 
(i) Appointment of directors, providing their names and background  
 (ii) Appointment of auditors, providing their names and fees.  
 
(iii) Dividend policy, providing the amount and explanation.  
Did the Chairman of the Board attend at least one of AGM in the past 
two years? A.5  
  
A.6*  (i) Did the CEO/Managing Director attend at least one of the AGM in 
the past two years? 
  
*  (ii) Is a name list of board attendance available?  
A.7  Do AGM minutes record that there was an opportunity for shareholders 
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to ask questions/ raise issues in the past one year? 
 (i) Is there record of answers and questions? 
 
(ii) Is any resolution being solved? 
  
A.8  Does the company have anti-takeover defenses?  
 (i) Cross shareholding  
 (ii) Pyramid holding  
 (iii) Board members hold more than 25% of share outstanding  
 
 
Section B -- Equitable Treatment of Shareholders  
B.1  Does the company offer one-share, one-vote?  
Is there any mechanism to allow minority shareholders to influence 
board composition? B.2  
  
B.3  Have there been any cases of insider trading involving company 
directors and management in the past two years? 
  
Does the company provide rationales/explanations for related-party 
transactions affecting the corporation? B.4*  
  
B.5  Is the company a part of an economic group where the 
parent/controlling shareholder also controls key suppliers, customers, 
and/or similar businesses? 
  
 
* denotes item included in the Transparency Index  
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B.6*  Has there been any non-compliance case regarding related-party transactions 
in the past one year?  
B.7* 
Does the company facilitate voting by proxy? 
B.8* (i) Does the notice to shareholders specify the documents required to give 
proxy? (ii) Is there any requirement for a proxy appointment to be notarized? 
B.9*  How many days in advance does the company send out the notice of general 
shareholder meetings?  
 
 
Section C -- The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance  
C.1*  Does the company explicitly mention the safety and welfare of its employees? 
C.2*  Does the company explicitly mention the role of key stakeholders such as 
customers or the community at large (or creditors or suppliers)?  
Does the company explicitly mention environmental issues in its public 
communications?  
C.3*  
C.4  Does the company provide an ESOP (employee share option program), or 
other long-term employee incentive plan linked to shareholder value creation, 
to employees? 
 
 
 
Section D -- Disclosure and Transparency Does the company have a 
transparent ownership structure?   
 
(i) Breakdown of shareholdings. (ii) Is it easy to identify beneficial 
ownership? (iii) Is director shareholdings disclosed? (iv) Is management 
shareholding disclosed?  D.1*  
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D.2 Does the company have a dispersed ownership structure? 
D.3  Is the company's actual ownership structure obscured by cross-shareholdings? 
D.4*  Assess the quality of the annual report. In particular, the following:  
(i) Financial performance (ii) Business operations and competitive position 
(iii) Board member background (iv) Basis of the board remuneration (v) 
Operating risks  
 
 
Is there any statement requesting the directors to report their transactions of 
company stock? 
D.5*  
Does the company use an internationally recognized accounting standard? 
D.6 
D.7*  (i) Does the company have an internal audit operation established as a 
separate unit in the company?  
 (ii) To whom does the internal audit function report, please identify?  
 * denotes item included in the Transparency Index  
 
D.8*  Does the company perform an annual audit using independent and 
reputable auditors? 
  
Are there any accounting qualifications in the audited financial 
statements apart from the qualification on Uncertainty of Situation? D.9*  
  
D.10*  Does the company offer multiple channels of access to information?  
 (i) Annual report  
 (ii) Company website  
 (iii) Analyst briefing  
 (iv) Press conference/ press briefing  
D.11  Is the financial report disclosed in a timely manner?  
D.12*  Does the company have a website, disclosing up-to-date information?  
 (i) Business operation  
 (ii) Financial statement  
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 (iii) Press release  
 (iv) Shareholding structure  
 (v) Organization structure  
 (vi) Corporate group structure  
 (vii) Annual report downloadable  
 (viii) Be provided in both Chinese and English  
 
Section E -- Responsibilities of the Board  
E1.1*  Does the company have its own written corporate governance rules?  
Does the board of directors provide a code of ethics or statement of 
business conduct for all directors and employees? E1.2*  
  
E1.3*  Does the company have a corporate vision/mission?  
Does the regulatory agency have any evidence of the firm’s 
non-compliance with rules and regulations over the last three years? E.2  
  
Assess the quality and content of the Audit Committee Report in the 
annual report. E.3*  
  
 (i) Attendance  
 (ii) Internal control  
 (iii) Management control  
 (iv) Proposed auditors  
 (v) Financial report review  
 (vi) Legal compliance  
 (vii) Conclusion or opinion  
E.4  Have board members participated in the China Securities Regulation 
Committee (or equivalent) training on corporate governance? 
  
How many board meetings are held per year?(at least twice one year is 
required in China) E.5  
  
E.6  (i) Is the chairman an independent director?  
 (ii) Is the chairman also the CEO?  
 * denotes item included in the Transparency Index  
 
E.7  Does the company have an option scheme which incentivizes top 
management? 
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 (i) Did the company have the option (and/ or other performance incentive) 
schemes in the past but still in effect? 
  
 (ii) Does the company currently have option (and/or other performance 
incentive) schemes? 
  
E.8  Does the board appoint independent committees with independent members 
to carry out various critical responsibilities such as: audit, compensation and 
director nomination? 
 (i) Audit  
 (ii) Compensation  
 (iii) Director nomination committee  
  
  
E.9  What is the size of the board?  
E.10  How many board members are non-executive directors?  
E.11*  Does company state in its annual report the definition of ‘independence'?  
E.12  Among directors, how many are independent directors?  
Does the company provide contact details for a specific investor relations 
person? E.13*  
  
E.14*  Does the company have a board of directors report?  
Does the company disclose how much they paid the independent non- 
executive directors? E.15  
  
Do the company provide training to directors (including executive and 
nonexecutive directors)? E.16  
  
 * denotes item included in the Transparency Index  
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Table 1 
Corporate Governance Score Statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics regarding our sample of firms in Singapore, which 
consists of all firms listed on SGX from 2006 to 2009. We delete from the sample any 
observation with missing values, and firms for which sufficient financial data is not available on 
Compustat. CG is a measure of corporate governance in the given year and is computed using 
120 criteria which covers 6 areas from shareholder rights to disclosure & transparency. 
 
Sector statistics of corporate governance score in Singapore 
 
Industry  2007  2008  Overall  
 Mean N Mean N Mean N 
Mining 66.3 13 65.54 13 65.9098 26 
  (0.65) (1.08)  (1.63) 
Construction 62.11 12 63.85 12 63.02 24 
  (-1.28) (0.60)  (-0.8) 
Manufacturing 64.66 229 62.46 224 63.52 453 
  (-0.46) (-0.99)  (-0.97) 
Transportation, Communications, 
Electric, Gas, And Sanitary 
Services 70.13** 40 67.07** 40 68.5** 80 
  (3.29) (3.10)  (4.48) 
Wholesale Trade 61.8* 51 60.12* 51 60.9* 102 
  (-2.3) (-2.3)  (-2.38) 
Retail Trade 66.32 19 64.08 19 65.1 38 
  (0.72) (0.72)  (0.98) 
Services 66.27 43 64.81 42 65.5* 85 
  (1.11) (1.54)  (1.88) 
 
*** Significant below the 1% level 
** Significant below the 5% level 
* Significant below the 10% level 
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Figure 1 
Portfolio value comparison  
Figure 1 shows the comparison of two portfolios consisted of the Singapore top 25% (well 
governed portfolio) and bottom 25% (poorly governed portfolio) firms. Values are adjusted with 
an initially 100 investment, both of the portfolio values are indicated by either blue (top 25%) or 
red (bottom 25%) lines. The grey line and brown dot is the profit made by buying the well 
governed portfolio and selling poorly governed portfolio in the sampling period indicated by the x 
axis. 
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 Table 2 
Zero-investment hedged portfolio return 
 
Table 2 shows the significance of a positive abnormal return if we long the well governed 
portfolio and short the poorly governed one. The sample used for t test is daily portfolio values. In 
the three year time horizon, the average monthly return for this hedged portfolio is 0.2%, which 
could be translated into a 2.4% annual return. If we conduct a “buy and hold” strategy, the return 
in 2006 is 1.82%, 2.6% in 2007, and 1.68% in 2008. In this three year full sample period make an 
average annual return of 2.03% 
 
 
T-test Procedure 
         
    Statistics     
Lower Lower Upper 
CL Upper CL Std CL Std 
N Mean Mean CL Mean Dev Std Evl Dec Std Err 
Portfolio Return 943 0.1024 5.2231 10.344 76.66 80.126 83.916 2.6093 
         
    T-Tests     
DF t Value Pr > | t |           
Portfolio Return 2.46 942 0.0278           
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Table 3 
 
Portfolio return decomposition 
 
This table shows the results of the performance evaluation regressions of equation (1), for 
longing the Singapore top 25% well governed listed companies and shorting the bottom 25% or 
shorting the intersect firms in the bottom 25% of 2007 and 2008. The regression is following the 
methods from Bauer et al. (2003). Besides controlling the variables from Fama-French three 
factors, the result is also corrected for style exposures using the Carhart Model. Sector 
adjustment applied by using sector dummies. T-statistics are stated in parentheses. The result is 
consistent with other results presented on the defense. In the second strategy, the performance 
differential between the good and bad governance portfolio is larger, about 6% annually.  
 
 
Value weighted Portfolio Performance Evaluation 
 
Table 3.1 short the bottom 25% portfolio  
            
 α Rmt-R SMB HML MOM f
Portfolio return  -0.00067 0.11614*   
t stat (-0.17) (2.65)   
Portfolio return -0.00128 0.10857** 0.0312   
t stat (-0.32) (2.38) (0.65)   
Portfolio return -0.00237 0.14241*** 0.16365** -0.26162**  
t stat (-0.62) (3.16) (2.29) (-2.38)  
Portfolio return -0.00253 0.14859*** 0.15538** -0.26256** 0.6536 
t stat (-0.67) (3.27) (2.17) (-2.39) (1.02) 
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Table 3.2 Portfolio Performance Evaluation 
 
Short the intersect firms between the bottom 25% firms in 2007 and 2008  
  α Rmt-R SMB HML MOM f
Singapore -0.01666 0.69465**  
t stat (-0.68) (2.53)  
Singapore -0.00682 0.81656** -0.50208*  
t stat (-0.28) (2.96) (-1.74)  
Singapore -0.0017 0.65774** -1.12371** 1.22783* 
t stat (-0.07) (2.34) (-2.52) (1.79) 
Singapore -0.00065 0.61572** -1.06743** 1.23418 -0.44468* 
t stat (-0.03) (2.17) (-2.39) (0.68) (-1.11) 
 
 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4 
 
Corporate governance and firm value in Year 2007 
Table 4 shows the result of firm valuation regression as equation 3(sector adjusted) on year 2007. 
The firm value is represented by Tobin’s Q. The four control variables are computed following 
the methods from Bauer & Gunster’s paper on 2003. This table shows that corporate governance 
plays a significant role in enhancing the firm value in Singapore and contributes to most of the 
significance in the residue. The number of observations on 2007 is 234. 
 
Year 2007 (Sector Adjusted) 
  α Book Value Age ROE ROE(lag) Corporate Governance 
Tobbin's Q 10.58*** -1.366***         
t stat (4.10) (-3.32) 
Tobbin's Q 10.56*** -1.347*** 0.00932 
t stat (3.72) (-3.31) (0.02) 
Tobbin's Q 10.95*** -0.993** -0.1109 -12.33725*** 
t stat (3.96) (-2.39) (-0.19) (-3.6) 
Tobbin's Q 12.51*** -1.30587** 0.12656 -13.109*** -0.29588 
t stat (3.74) (-2.51) (0.17) (-3.2) (-0.31) 
Tobbin's Q -26.34 -1.28** 0.03263 -13.95*** -0.206 9.27151*** 
t stat (-1.1) (-2.49) (0.04) (-3.42) (-0.22) (3.17) 
 
 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5 
 
Corporate governance and firm value in Year 2008 
Table 4 shows the result of firm valuation regression as equation 3(sector adjusted) on year 2008. 
The firm value is represented by Tobin’s Q. T he four control variables are computed following 
the methods from Bauer & Gunster’s paper on 2003. Like the year 2007, this table shows that 
corporate governance plays a significant role in enhancing the firm value in Singapore and 
contributes to most of the significance in the residue. The number of observations on 2008 is 271 
 
Year 2008 sector adjusted 
  α Book Value Age ROE ROE(lag) Corporate Governance 
Tbbin's Q 4.26*** -0.2098**         
t stat (7.48) (-2.56) 
Tobin's Q 3.623*** -0.2077** 0.2825* 
t stat (5.64) (-2.56) (2.08) 
Tobin's Q 3.529*** -0.18381* 0.2786* -0.34 
t stat (5.36) (-2.14) (2.02) (-0.87) 
Tobin's Q 3.597*** -0.2352* 0.2718 -0.7336 1.3852 
t stat (4.87) (-2.27) (1.64) (-1.42) (-1.4) 
Tobin's Q -0.2466 -0.2564** 0.2429 -0.7089 1.2781 0.9751** 
t stat (-0.08) (-2.45) (1.46) (-1.37) (1.53) (2.36) 
 
 
 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 6 
 
Corporate governance and firm operating performance in year 2008 
Table 6 shows the result of firm valuation regression as equation 3&4 on year 2008. The firm 
performances are represented by Net profit margin and Return on equity. The regression is 
constructed following Bauer & Gunster’s paper on 2003. In consistent with UK result, corporate 
governance are not significantly related to the firm operating performance. The T-statistics are 
stated in parentheses 
 
  Model 1 sector adjusted Model 2 sector adjusted 
  Net Profit margin Return On Equity 
Year 2007 2008 2007 2008 
Intercept 0.13 -0.02507 -0.4889 -0.4787 
t stat (0.42) (-0.06) (-1.54) (-0.45) 
Book/Market Ratio 0.00 0.00914 0.00 0.0007 
t stat (0.01) (0.60) (1.63) (0.33) 
Corporate governance  0.02 0.04915 0.12 0.042 
t stat (0.23) (0.50) (1.57) (0.17) 
 
 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 7 
 
Discretionary accruals descriptive statistics 
Table 7 shows the statistics for discretionary accruals calculated from modified Jones model 
(Formula 11 from Data and Methodology) in year 2007 and 2008. We can found on the table that 
the discretionary accruals in 2007 are mostly positive, while the discretionary accruals in 2008 
are mostly negative. Because earning management can be either up or down, it would make more 
sense by comparing the size of discretionary accruals in both year, following Cornett (2006) 
 
Discretionary Accruals Descriptive Statistics 
 
25th 75th Standard 
Deviation Fyear Variable N Mean Median percentile percentile 
Discretionary 
Accruals/Assets 
2007  445 0.039456 0.018335 0.112 0.007793 0.03897 
Abs(Discretionary 
  Accruals)/Assets 445 0.039626 0.018748 0.11195 0.007994 0.03897 
      
Discretionary 
Accruals/Assets 
2008  420 -0.21289 -0.097857 0.433 -0.22768 -0.0318 
Abs(Discretionary 
  Accruals)/Assets 420 0.21 0.10 0.43289 0.031917 0.22768 
      
Discretionary 
Accruals/Assets 
Pooled  865 -0.08307 0.001245 0.34 -0.092599 0.01952 
Abs(Discretionary 
  Accruals)/Assets 865 0.124203 0.03431 0.32389 0.0123649 0.11451 
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Table 8 
 
Corporate governance and earning management in year 2007 
The dependent variable in regression 1 is signed discretionary accruals, in regression 2 it is the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals which represents the size of discretionary accrual in this 
year. Discretionary accruals are defined as the difference between actual accruals and the 
accruals predicted from the modified Jones models (Equation 1). Regression is estimated as a 
pooled cross section for SGS listed companies. No significance is found in year 2007 samples. 
The number of observation on 2007 is 266, sector adjustment applied. 
Subindex A: Rights of Shareholders 
Subindex B: Equitable treatment of Shareholders 
Subindex C: Roles of Stakeholders in CG 
Subindex D: Disclosure and Transparency 
Subindex E: Responsibilities of the Board 
 
Dependent Variable 
Discretionary Accruals as Size of Discretionary Accruals 
Percentage of Assets as Percent of Assets Explanatory  
Variable Regression 1 Regression 2 
      
Ln(Subindex A) -0.00573 -0.00601 
  (-0,4) (-0.42) 
Ln(Subindex B) -0.00937 -0.00937 
  (-0.78) (-0.78) 
Ln(SubindexC) -0.00895 -0.00879 
  (-1.4) (-1.12) 
Ln(Subindex D) -0.01229 -0.01226 
  (-0.7) (-0.69) 
Ln(Subindex E) 0.01065 0.01096 
  -0.6 -0.61 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.005 -0.00494 
  (-1.44) (-1.41) 
 
 
 
Note: 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 9 
 
Corporate governance and earning management in year 2008 
The dependent variable in regression 1 is signed discretionary accruals, in regression 2 it is the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals which represents the size of discretionary accrual in this 
year. Discretionary accruals are defined as the difference between actual accruals and the 
accruals predicted from the modified Jones models (Equation 1). Regression is estimated as a 
pooled cross section for SGS listed companies. Significance was found both on sub-index B and 
sub-index D. The number of observation on 2007 is 319, sector adjustment applied. 
Subindex A: Rights of Shareholders 
Subindex B: Equitable treatment of Shareholders 
Subindex C: Roles of Stakeholders in CG 
Subindex D: Disclosure and Transparency 
Subindex E: Responsibilities of the Board 
 
Discretionary Accruals for SGX listed companies 
Dependent Accruals as Percentage Size of Discretionary Accruals as 
of Assets Percent of Assets  Explanatory 
Variable Regression 1 Regression 2 
    
ln (Subindex A) 0.1839* -0.1840* 
  (1.85) (-1.85) 
ln (Subindex B) -0.6547** 0.6** 
  (-2.0) (2.10) 
ln (SubindexC) 0.176** -0.175 
  (2.28) (-2.27) 
ln (Subindex D) 0.3566** -0.35571** 
  (2.10) (-2.1) 
ln (Subindex E) 0.2184 -0.2203 
  (1.42) (-1.16) 
ln (Firm Age) 0.0188 -0.0186 
  (0.70) (-0.7) 
 
 
 
Note: 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 10 
 
Corporate governance and earning management in full sample 
Here we combined the 2007 and 2008 data together into a panel dataset. The dependent variable 
in regression 1 is signed discretionary accruals, in regression 2 it is the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals which represents the size of discretionary accrual in this year. 
Discretionary accruals are defined as the difference between actual accruals and the accruals 
predicted from the modified Jones models (Equation 1). Regression is estimated as a pooled 
cross section for SGS listed companies. Significance on sub-index B is largely reduced, but 
significance on sub-index D still holds. The number of observation for full sample is 585, sector 
adjustment applied. 
Subindex A: Rights of Shareholders 
Subindex B: Equitable treatment of Shareholders 
Subindex C: Roles of Stakeholders in CG 
Subindex D: Disclosure and Transparency 
Subindex E: Responsibilities of the Board 
 
Discretionary Accruals for SGX listed companies (sector adjusted) 
Dependent Accruals as Size of Discretionary Accruals 
Percentage of Assets as Percent of Assets 
Explanatory Variable Regression 1 Regression 2 
  
ln (Subindex A) 0.00616 -0.01443 
  (0.20) (-0.47) 
ln (Subindex B) -0.09586 0.09 
  (-1.73) (1.80) 
ln (SubindexC) 0.07734*** -0.085** 
  (2.56) (-2.58) 
ln (Subindex D) 0.0565 -0.103* 
  (0.83) (-1.83) 
ln (Subindex E) 0.0706 -0.04737 
  -1.11 (-0.74) 
 
 
Note: 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
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